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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the nature of preferences for the preservation of biodiversity, and the
extent to which individuals are well-informed about biodiversity. We present evidence that
the elicitation of monetary bids to pay for biodiversity preservation, as required for cost-
benefit analysis, fails as a measure of welfare changes due to the prevalence of preferences
which neoclassical economics defines as lexicographic. That is, a significant proportion of
individuals refuse to make trade-offs which require the substitution of biodiversity for other
goods. In addition, we show that understanding of the biodiversity concept is extremely
limited, raising concerns over a reliance on stated preferences, as revealed in contingent
valuation studies, for decision-making on this issue. Results from two samples (students and
the general public) are described.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
One of the few agreements made at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, concerned the preservation of biodiversity. The
Convention on Biological Diversity provides an overall framework for international action to
protect species and their habitats. Countries ratifying the Convention are required to identify
and monitor their biological resources and to produce plans for conserving them; including
the establishment of protected areas. The Convention also contains provisions to encourage
access to and transfers of technology, on mutually agreed terms, to facilitate the safe use of
biotechnology, and to promote benefit sharing arrangements between countries providing
valuable biological resources and those who “develop” these resources. These latter
provisions may be limited due to concerns (eg, within the UK government) that transfer of
technology and biotechnology are undesirable (probably due to concerns over trade
competition). As with other international treaties, sovereign nations are left to their own
devices in order to satisfy treaty requirements.
The Convention has motivated public agencies (such as the Forestry Commission in
the UK)  to attempt to measure biodiversity. The movement towards the adoption of a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) approach to this issue can be seen on at least two fronts. First,
legislation concerning public projects has become increasingly environmentally-friendly 
because of a publicly recognised need to conserve scarce resources. Current legislation in
Europe requires the use of environmental impact assessment (where impacts are measured in
physical units) for certain projects, under Directive 85/337. CBA is an alternative paradigm
for measuring environmental impacts. Indeed, in the US, environmental impact assessment
was followed chronologically by President Reagan's executive order 12291, mandating the
use of CBA for public projects and policies. Second, the imposition of biodiversity
constraints in developing countries will need some justification. Preventing development
projects because of their adverse impacts on biodiversity may disproportionately affect the
economies of less developed countries, who can point out that developing countries allowed
3declines in their own biodiversity levels during early industrialisation. The costs and benefits
of biodiversity protection, and their incidence, is a question of political economy which raises
issues of economic and political values.
If decisions about biodiversity protection are to be made on the basis of CBA, then
some means of placing an economic value on the benefits of actions which increase
biodiversity protection is necessary. This is complicated by the non-market nature of many of
these benefits. While much work in environmental economics during the last 20 years has
focused on such non-market valuation, the application of benefit measurement techniques to
biodiversity confronts two problems:
1. Individuals may be unwilling to trade-off increases/decreases in biodiversity against
losses/gains in income. For example, a certain proportion of the population may hold
rights-based beliefs which would prevent them from agreeing to such trade-offs (for a
discussion in the intergenerational context see Spash 1993b). In the current context, I
might believe that a particular species has the right to be saved from extinction
regardless of its utilitarian value, or of the costs to society of preserving it. Such non-
compensatory decision rules are referred to by neoclassical economists as representing 
“lexicographic preferences”. If lexicographic preferences are found to exist  amongst a
significant proportion of the population the use of CBA would be questionable. CBA
is founded upon the concept of compensating for welfare losses, as expressed in the
Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation test. Lexicographic preferences and the
implications for CBA are discussed more fully in the next section.
2. Many individuals may be unsure as to the meaning of biodiversity, and the
implications to them of preventing a loss in biodiversity. If biodiversity is a poorly-
understood concept, then this again militates against the use of CBA as the sole
criteria for decisions over biodiversity protection. Whilst the valuation of benefits
under uncertainty has been the subject of much attention in the environmental
4economics literature (eg., Meier and Randall, 1991), others have expressed concerns
that poorly informed consumers cannot be relied upon to make sensible decisions
about complex environmental phenomena (eg., Sagoff, 1988). In this paper we are
concerned about the extent to which people are aware of the complex issue of 
biodiversity protection.
In what follows, section II explains the meaning of lexicographic preferences and sets
out the theoretical implications for CBA. This section also considers the implications of ill-
informed consumers. Section III describes the design of two surveys carried out to assess the
importance of these issues. Section IV details our main results, whilst Section V offers
conclusions and suggestions for future research.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Lexicographic Preferences
The typical approach to the valuation of non-market environmental assets (such as
wildlife) in environmental economics has been to treat such assets identically to marketed
goods and services (eg., Braden and Kolstad, 1991). For example, if W represents the stock of
isome particular wild species, such as golden eagles, and X  represent marketed goods (where i
= 1 to n), then a standard theoretical assumption is the existence of the direct utility function:
iU = U (X , W) (1)
which is typically assumed to be weakly separable in some elements of X and W. The
1 2willingness-to-pay (WTP) of an individual to prevent a decrease in W from W  to W  is given
by:
1 2WTP = e (p, W , U ) -  e (p, W , U ) (2)1 1
i where U  is the post-change level of welfare, p is a price vector for X  and e (.) is an1
expenditure function. An individual would therefore be prepared to give up some
consumption of X to maintain their utility level constant. The WTP amounts are typically
5summed across all affected individuals to obtain an aggregate WTP figure. Similarly, the
minimum compensation demanded to accept a reduction in W for an individual is given by:
1 2WTAC = e (p, W , U ) - e (p, W , U ) (3)0 0
where WTAC is willingness to accept compensation and U  is the initial, pre-change level of0
iwelfare. In this case expenditure on X  rises to compensate for the reduction in W, keeping
the agent at their initial level of welfare. The welfare measures of WTP and WTAC are not
expected to be equivalent, due to the potential for loss aversion (Knetsch, 1990), income
effects (Willig, 1976) and substitution effects (Adamowicz, Bhardwaj and MacNab, 1993).
However, some individuals may treat certain environmental goods differently from
the manner suggested by this theoretical framework. If an individual believes that aspects of
the environment, such as wildlife, have an absolute right to be protected, then that individual
will refuse all money trade-offs which decrease what is regarded as an environmental
commodity in the neoclassical framework (Spash 1993b). In terms of equations (2) and (3)
above, WTAC would be infinite and WTP the entire budget, since the respondent believes
that W should remain at or above its current level (that is, that no reductions in W should be
allowed). In fact individuals may express a zero WTP as a protest against the implication that
such things as the right of a species to exist could be traded for other goods or money.
Such a non-compensatory stance can be viewed as evidence of a lexicographic
preference. Lexicographic preferences mean that utility functions including W are
undefinable for an individual (since the axiom of continuity is violated), and that indifference
surfaces are single points in (n+1) dimensional space (Gravelle and Rees, 1993). The standard
explanation of lexicographic preferences in goods space is shown in Figure 1 (eg., Varian,
1984 or Malinvaud, 1972), where for simplicity only two goods, W and X, are assumed to
1 1provide utility. Assume an individual starts with an endowment of W  and X  at point A. No
increase in X can compensate this individual for a reduction in W (their WTAC for a decrease
in W is infinite), but holding W constant and increasing X gives greater utility. Wildlife has a
priority over other goods. Thus, the only point on the line segment (C, A, B) which gives
1equal utility to A is A itself, whilst any reduction in W below W  will give less utility,
6irrespective of any associated increase in X. As a result the shaded area of Figure 1 shows the
bundles of  goods W and X which are preferred to that at A; note this includes the line
segment AB. All points are either better than A or worse than A, none are of equal utility.
Thus, point A, rather than an indifference curve, describes the individual's preferences and no
indifference curves exist. The implication that one good (here W ) is immeasurably more
important than another (here X ) has lead to lexicographic preferences being regarded as
unrealistic and unlikely to occur in economics (Malinvaud, 1972 p.20).
However, some evidence for the existence of lexicographic preferences has been put
forward. For example, Stevens et al. (1991) discuss the idea of a minimum level of X (in their
case income) which must exist before an individual will value wildlife, and relate this to
lexicographic preferences. Their explanation is described by Figure 2, which is similar to
Figure 1. Again consider an individual located initially at point A. Stevens et al. (1991 p.397)
1 minclaim this individual would be WTP the same amount (X -X ) regardless of the extent to
minwhich a reduction in the wildlife population is prevented. The level X , while unexplained
in the Stevens et al. paper, could be regarded as the lowest amount of X which ensures human
minsurvival or a minimum standard of living. At a point such as D, which lies below X ,
willingness to pay is undefined. Thus, WTP no longer relates to equivalent surplus;
undermining its use as a measure of welfare changes. Stevens et al. collected data on
individual preferences and found that around 25% of their sample revealed preferences for
wildlife preservation in the USA which could be described as lexicographic in this sense.1
The description of lexicographic preferences given by Stevens et al. deviates from that
normally used, and described in Figure 1, in two ways. First, they allow individuals to either
mincare solely about income (until X ) or solely about wildlife. Lexicographic preferences as
described in Figure 1 allow increases in income to increase welfare as long as wildlife is
unaffected. This allows movements along the line segment AB to increase welfare, rather
than implying all income will be sacrificed for wildlife increases; restricting movements to
      The species studied were bald eagle, wild turkey, coyote and salmon. Stevens et al1
say that 70% of all respondents gave responses inconsistent with either neoclassical or
lexicographic preferences, but that 80% of the remainder had lexicographic preferences.
71 minthe right of W  along X . If income becomes of no significance this would imply vertical
indifference curves, ie., additional income is neither good nor bad, and the result would be
corner solutions. Second, the idea of a minimum living standard as a constraint on standard
lexicographic preferences restricts the extent to which X is regarded as a second class good to
minW. This raises some interesting possibilities because X  as the minimum standard of living
is susceptible to being culturally determined and is consistent with a variety of material levels
of well-being (Sen 1987). Thus respondents with lexicographic preferences who regard
themselves as on the minimum standard of living (which can, as Sen points out, be consistent
with owning say a car and a television) will be willing-to-pay nothing for increases in wildlife
because they cannot afford to do so but will give an infinite valuation of a decrease in
wildlife.
If increases, rather than decreases, in W are considered an irreversible aspect of 
lexicographic preferences is apparent. In Figure 3 the individual is again assumed to start at
1 1 2point A with W=W  and X=X . From the above discussion an increase in W to W  means the
individual will be willing to give up X to have this increase in W, so long as X stays above
min 2 2X . The combination at point E with (X , W ) would give greater utility than the
1 1combination at point A with (X , W ) (remember that wildlife always has priority over all
other goods for this individual). However, once the move to E has been made there would be
no way to go back to A without reducing utility and the reduction in W this implies would be
2given an infinite valuation. In this way W  now becomes the new reference point at or above
1which wildlife must be maintained. More generally, if W is increased the entire amount X -
minX  will be paid (the WTP amount), but if this is reversed the required compensation is
infinite (the WTAC amount).
A belief system which denies trade-offs drives at the heart of modern welfare
economics which has been built around the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation test. This
test allows for projects to be approved where there is the potential to make at least one person
better-off and none worse-off, ie., some potential resource distribution after the project could
achieve a Pareto improvement. Thus, knowledge of the required potential compensation is
8necessary and, in the neoclassical framework, would be based upon individual preferences.
This criterion becomes inoperable once compensatory amounts become infinite. Furthermore
CBA itself is meaningless under non-compensatory preferences. Two relevant research
questions in the current context are: (i) whether any individuals actually hold lexicographic
preferences for biodiversity protection; and (ii) do these individuals hold such preferences
irrespective of whether a gain or a loss in biodiversity is proposed? In this paper, we present
some evidence on (i), leaving (ii) for future research.
First, though, we discuss a second problem for biodiversity valuation. That is the
problem of information provision and knowledge about the concept of biodiversity. One
question this raises concerns the extent to which knowledge may be linked to lexicographic
preferences. This line of reasoning might say that poorly informed individuals rely upon
lexicographic preferences, or, more generally, individuals facing ignorance refuse trade-offs.
However, we would reject the suggestion that any simple relationship exists between
information provision and ethical stance. For example, providing additional information on
biodiversity to a vegan, animal rights activist is unlikely to make them become a meat eating,
utilitarian. Additional information could, with equal plausibility, make respondents either
more or less likely to behave in a utilitarian manner. This question might be framed as a
hypothesis for empirical testing but is one which we leave for future research.
Uncertainty About Biodiversity
In this section we wish to conceptualize biodiversity as a good whose characteristics
are unclear to individuals. For example, biodiversity may be important for the continued
existence of an individual, or for the existence of their offspring, but the relationship is vague
and the cause-effect mechanisms removed from the individual's everyday experience of life.
The state of the natural environment affects welfare (or utility) in two ways: first, by
providing aesthetic and recreational benefits directly to individuals; and second, by providing
inputs to production eg., oil extraction, health maintenance, pollution assimilation, and global
life support services such as climate control, atmospheric composition, nutrient cycling (for
9discussions of  biodiversity value see McNeely 1988, Soulé and Wilcox 1980, or Wilson
1988). In the case of indirect inputs their very definition makes them less perceptible to
individuals. Biodiversity provides indirect benefits in terms of ecosystem stability and the
preservation of genetic variation which may one day be useful for medical, agricultural or
forestry use. For example, if pests on currently-grown varieties of wheat became very difficult
to control (due, for example, to the build-up of resistance to pesticides), then new varieties
which were resistant to attack might be developed using the gene pool which had been
safeguarded by biodiversity protection policies. Alternatively, if breeds of fish currently used
in aquaculture became very susceptible to fungal attack, then again resistant species or
varieties could be found given that they have been preserved as the result of biodiversity
legislation. If individuals are uninformed about these possible benefits of preserving diversity,
then preservation benefits will be under-stated.2
Whilst much debate has attended the problem of measuring biodiversity (eg., Solow et
al., 1993), the basic idea here is that biodiversity protection is “produced” by some mix of
genetic, species and ecosystem preservation.3 Thus, when individuals are asked to value a
particular level of biodiversity, they are attributing value to those genes/species/ecosystems
that contribute to diversity. In order to obtain a working definition of biodiversity, the
following statement has been compiled as a useful summary of key concepts, based upon the
global biodiversity strategy of the World Resources Institute (WRI), the World Conservation
Union (IUCN) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (WRI, IUCN and
UNEP 1992):
Biodiversity is the totality of genes, species and ecosystems in a region.
Genetic diversity refers to the variation of genes within species. Species
diversity refers to the variety of species within a region. Ecosystem diversity
      Although it is possible to argue here that these expected benefits could be valued2
directly by the economist (in terms of expected losses avoided) without recourse to seeking
individual preferences.
      Solow et al discuss three measures, which allow for genetic gaps between species,3
the number of species, and intra-species genetic gaps.
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refers to the variety of systems of living things in relationship with their
environment, within a region.
In other words, preserving a given ecosystem, for example, generates a number of utilitarian
benefits (recreational use and flood protection perhaps, for a wetland), but also generates net
benefits in terms of its contribution to the measure of diversity (so long as this preservation is
independent of any action which reduces diversity to a greater degree). However, in what
follows biodiversity is treated as a (composite) good, rather than in terms of its determinants
or services, because this is the approach most likely under a CBA due to its simplicity.
If we persist along a neoclassical route, the characteristics of biodiversity can be
idefined as z , where i goes from 1 to m. Assume the individual has prior beliefs about the
probability distribution of each of these characteristics given by a subjective probability
idensity function g(z), with a cumulative distribution function G(z  ). This model is consistent
with an individual believing biodiversity to have some characteristics which are in fact absent
(z=0, g(z)>0); and with biodiversity actually having characteristics which the individual
believes are absent (z>0, g(z)=0).
The problem can be simplified by assuming that there is only one characteristic of
interest. Hanley and Munro (1994) have used this approach to show that supplying
individuals with increasing amounts of “good” information (ie., information relating to
desirable characteristics)  will increase their true willingness to pay. Their cumulative
probability distribution is Gì (z), where Gì (z) second-order stochastically dominates G(z). This
assumes that biodiversity protection enters the representative agent's utility function in
accordance with the axioms of preference, ie., preferences for biodiversity are assumed not to
be lexicographic. The observation that telling people more about the characteristics of a good
can increase the value they place on that good is one which seems intuitively obvious.
Although, as Hanley and Munro (1994) show, more information about a desirable
characteristic only increases WTP under certain circumstances. Conversely, telling people
more about some undesirable characteristic of a good may reduce their estimate of its value to
them. Relatively “uninformed” consumers seem likely to place a lower value on the
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environment generally, and biodiversity in particular. Hanley and Munro also show that no
general conclusion can be drawn for the impact of increased information on the variance of
WTP.
A rather different, and more difficult, issue is how much information should be
provided to individuals if a public agency is interested in their revealed or stated preferences
as a guide to policy. This in turn begs the question as to the likely costs to the economy, in
efficiency terms, of uninformed decisions.In terms of neoclassical theory, additional
information should be provided to individuals as long as the expected value of that
information is greater than its cost (Adams and Crocker, 1984).4 Thus, an individual would,
ex post, be willing to pay an amount up to the increase in the expected utility from the
resource in question for this additional information. In addition, if the cost of providing
information publicly (eg., in a contingent valuation survey) is lower than the cost faced by
individuals of privately gathering the same information, then the public provision of
information is efficient. However, there is also a problem over how much information on
complex environmental resources, such as biodiversity, that individuals can be expected to
assimilate and understand.5
Thus, for both direct and indirect benefits of biodiversity protection, we would argue
that (i) uninformed preferences are likely to under-estimate the social value of biodiversity
protection; and (ii) that if preferences for biodiversity protection are to be sought as a guide to
policy decisions, individuals need to be given as much information on biodiversity protection
as they can be reasonably expected to assimilate. In this regard, discovering the extent of
ignorance amongst the public concerning the benefits of biodiversity protection becomes
extremely important.
     A large literature exists in economics concerning the subject of uncertainty, for a4
summary see Kreps, 1991.
      The NOAA Panel Report on the contingent valuation method recommends that5
respondents be given as much information as they might reasonably be expected to
assimilate; and that researchers test whether respondents have understood the information




This section reports on the collection of data from two samples to investigate the
issues of (i) the level of ignorance amongst individuals regarding the meaning of biodiversity;
and (ii) the willingness of individuals to trade-off changes in the level of biodiversity
protection for changes in their income in a hypothetical market situation. The first sample was
drawn from the population of students at the University of Stirling, whilst the second was a
stratified random sample of the general public. Students were used because they represented
an easily accessible group of individuals. Student responses were compared with those of the
public sample, since we were interested to know how much the student-derived results would
differ from those obtained from the general public.
The student sample was obtained by advertising at the university for participants at a
one-hour session. Students were offered a payment of £6 if they attended the session, and
completed the requirements of the session leader (the same leader was used in all sessions).
Each group consisted of about 25 students, and the total sample size was 125. The students
were faced with two areas of questions; first (chronologically), with questions related to their
knowledge of biodiversity (stage one). Second, with a contingent valuation question, which
asks for their maximum WTP to prevent a hypothetical but well-defined reduction in
biodiversity (stage two). Questions on age, sex and income were also included in stage two.
At the beginning of each session, a brief, general introduction about the project was given,
with students being asked to take the task seriously, think carefully before answering each
question, and answer without conferring.
The survey of the general public was carried out, by a market research company, using
face-to-face questioning of individuals in the street to obtain a quota sample. This sample
received the same questions as the students (both stage one and stage two). A copy of one
version of the questionnaire (that relating to animal rights) is provided in Appendix One. For
a detailed discussion of the contingent valuation method see Mitchell and Carson (1989).
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Stage One Results: knowledge about biodiversity
The objectives of stage one of the student survey were to (i) investigate peoples'
knowledge of what biodiversity means; (ii) confront them with different notions of
biodiversity; and (iii) investigate their familiarity with the “official” definitions of
biodiversity. With regard to (i), participants were asked an open-ended question which ran as
follows:
"What does the word “biodiversity” suggest to you?"
Individual's responses to this question were analyzed using a word-counting programme:
most common occurrences of relevant terms were "species", "different", "biological", "plants"
and "diversity". With regard to (ii), three possible meanings of biodiversity were shown
consecutively to respondents, who were asked to either agree, disagree or say that they were
unsure if this description accorded with their understanding of biodiversity. The three
possible meanings (which respondents were told were inclusive ie., more than one could be
true) related to species diversity, genetic diversity and ecosystem diversity. With regard to
(iii), two definitions were presented. These were, first an “official” definition, based upon the
biodiversity strategy report as given earlier (WRI, IUCN and UNEP 1992), and second a
definition of biodiversity applied to UK forests which was supplied by Forestry Commission
researchers. Individuals were asked to score their familiarity with these two definitions on
five point Likert scales, from 1 (totally unfamiliar) to 5 (totally familiar).
Simple descriptive statistics from stage one are given in Table 1. As may be seen,
most disagreement was with the genetic variation aspect of biodiversity, and least
disagreement with the species variation notion. Concerning respondent familiarity with
IUCN/WWF/UNEP based definition of biodiversity only 5 respondents scored 5, although
43% registered either a 3,4 or 5 score. 46 respondents (37%) were totally unfamiliar. The
mean score was 2.27. The modal response was also "totally unfamiliar". This pattern is
repeated for the Forestry Commission definition of biodiversity, with slightly more
respondents in the "totally unfamiliar" category (46%) and slightly fewer (3%) in the "totally
familiar" class. Again, less than half of all respondents were "familiar" (scores 3,4,5) with
14
34% in this category. The mean score was 2.09.
A correlation matrix  is shown as Table 2. These correlations are in accordance with
expectations, and indicate a degree of internal consistency in students' responses.  For
example, familiarity with the general definition of biodiversity is positively correlated to
being aware of the species, genetic and ecosystem notions of biodiversity, and to familiarity
with the forest biodiversity definition (here a high value of +0.725).6 Cross-correlations
between all three notions of biodiversity (species, genetic and ecosystem variation) are all
positive, although rather small. Interestingly, the correlations between the two familiarity
scores and genetic diversity are lower than those between these scores and either species or
ecosystem diversity. This possibly reflects the higher proportion of “disagree” responses to
the genetic diversity concept.
Turning to the general public sample, the most common phrases used in answer to the
question: "What does the word “biodiversity” suggest to you?" were "don't know", "haven't a
clue" and "nothing". This indicates a low degree of understanding compared to the student
sample, as might be expected due to the lower mean educational level of the general public.
These respondents were then confronted with the three biodiversity concepts (species, genetic
and ecosystem diversity) and asked whether they agreed, disagreed or were unsure about
these interpretations. Results are given in Table 3. As can be seen, a roughly equal number of
people agreed with each notion of biodiversity. Most disagreements were with species
diversity, while most "don't know" comments were given for ecosystem diversity. Compared
with the student survey, the most striking features are (i) the greater percentage of "don't
know" responses in the street survey, and (ii) the smaller proportion of "disagree" responses
in the street survey.
Respondents were then confronted with the IUCN/UNEP/WWF based definition of
biodiversity, and the Forestry Commission definition of biodiversity in UK forests. As with
the student surveys, respondents were asked to rank their familiarity with these concepts on a
       A positive correlation was also found with the number of conservation groups to6
which the respondent belonged (+0.314). 
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5 point scale from 1 (totally unfamiliar) to 5 (totally familiar). For the general biodiversity
definition, the mean score was 1.52, which is lower than the student survey score of 2.27.
Only 6% of respondents were totally familiar with the definition, whilst 71% were totally
unfamiliar (student surveys = 37%). For the forest biodiversity definition, the mean score was
1.49 (students = 2.09), with 2% being totally familiar, and 67% being totally unfamiliar.
Correlation coefficients for the three biodiversity definitions and the two agency based
definitions are shown in Table 4. These results also show a degree of internal consistency, as
an awareness of one concept of biodiversity increases one's awareness score for another
concept. For example, the familiarity scores for general biodiversity and forest biodiversity
are highly positively correlated (+0.736).
Stage Two Results: biodiversity protection versus income changes
The second stage of the survey asked both samples to state their WTP to avoid a
hypothetical reduction in biodiversity.7 This reduction in biodiversity was characterised as
the destruction of a remnant of the Caledonian pine forest (Crannoch Wood). Such ancient
woodland is a rapidly-disappearing ecosystem in Scotland, and is the principle habitat of rare
birds (eg., the Capercaillie and Crested Tit) and rare mammals (eg., the Scottish Wildcat and
Pine Marten). The “bid vehicle” used in this case was donations to a trust fund set up to
protect the forest. Conservation bodies have used such trust funds in the past to acquire
similar threatened habitats in the UK.8
We were most interested in whether individuals gave a positive or a zero WTP
response. In the latter case, respondents were asked why they bid zero. The possible motives
supplied to respondents include some which are consistent with a refusal to trade-off
environmental gains for changes in income. These motives were then related to the beliefs of
      We were unable to measure Willingness to Accept Compensation measures in this7
study, due to funding constraints. 
      Such as the purchase of another remnant of the Caledonian pine forest (Abernethy8
Forest) by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.
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respondents concerning (a) their ethical view on rights ie., whether animals, plants or
ecosystems have the right to be protected regardless of what it costs society; and (b) the
environmental stance of individuals eg., whether environmental problems are capable of
technical fixes or require a significant change in preferences/behaviour. In case (a), sub-
samples were defined according to whether respondents were asked about animal, plant or
ecosystem rights. Each respondent appears in one sub-sample only. In case (b), the intention
was to characterise respondents' basic attitudes to the environment, using the classification
adopted by Spash (1993a).
Initially, analysis is presented on each of the student sub-samples in turn. When
considering each of the sub-samples the reader should remember that the contingent valuation
question, and (where appropriate) reasons for a “zero” response, were asked before the
questions on beliefs or rights. A summary of our results for the student sample is given in
Table 5.
Sub-sample one: animal rights. Of 42 responses in this class, 29 individuals were
WTP some positive amount to protect biodiversity. The mean bid was £15.07, the standard
deviation £34.78. Of those 11 bidding zero, the motives for so doing were: "can't afford it"
(one person), "Biodiversity should be protected by law" (eight people) and "other" (one
person). No zero responses were tendered for reasons of zero value. All 42 respondents said
that animals had the right to be protected. While 16 individuals said that animals should be
protected in relation to the cost, only 26 said that this right should be upheld regardless of the
cost (a belief in absolute rights). These 26 persons included 19 individuals who were WTP
some positive amount, ie., in spite of their implied infinite valuation. This might be
interpreted as either:
(i) Inconsistent preferences. This could be taken as implying that the WTP bids of such
respondents are failing to show their true preferences under the contingent valuation
method; or
(ii) WTP failure. This would imply that the WTAC of these persons would be infinite,
even though their WTP is positive.
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The correlation coefficient between a belief in rights and WTP was -0.075, so that WTP falls
as a belief in rights increases.
All respondents said that environmental problems are serious, and only one stated that
they could be solved by technological fixes. This shows a strong tendency towards the
classification of deep ecologist or environmental vanguard in this sample. The former
position would reject the neoclassical utilitarian approach while the latter can be consistent
with this but evidence shows is liable to reject it in favour of a rights-based approach (Spash
1993a). The classification of ecologists as shallow and deep is due to Arne Naess (1973).
Shallow ecologists are concerned with the welfare of human-beings or a sub-group of human-
beings, while deep ecologists take a holistic view emphasising the interrelated nature of all
things and the equal right of each being to “live and blossom”. Such a rights-based system  of
belief is clearly at odds with the teleological perspective of utilitarianism. The environmental
vanguard has been defined by Milbraith (1984) as comprising individuals who place a high
value on nature, are compassionate towards other species, people and generations, wish to
plan and act to avoid risks to ecosystems, recognise the limits to growth, and believe a new
society is required which changes human economic and political behaviour rather than relying
on technical solutions to environmental problems.
Sub-sample two: biotic rights. Of 42 responses in this class, 29 individuals were WTP
some positive amount for biodiversity protection. The mean bid was £12.17, the standard
deviation £22.41. Of those bidding zero, the 11 responses were accounted for as follows:
"can't afford it" (two people), "protection by law" (eight people) and "other" (one person). No
zero responses were tendered for reasons of zero value. There were 40 respondents who said
that plants and trees have the right to be protected, and 2 disagreed. Amongst the former
group, 24 said that protection should be irrespective of costs, and 16 disagreed. Of those who
believed that protection should be extended irrespective of costs, 18 were WTP a positive
amount for the protection of biodiversity. The two possible interpretations of these responses
is as discussed in the preceding section. The correlation coefficient between WTP and a belief
in absolute rights was positive in this sub-sample, indicating that WTP increases with a belief
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in absolute rights. Again all 42 respondents thought that environmental problems are serious,
with only 3 indicating a faith in technological fixes.
Sub-sample three: ecosystem rights. Of 41 responses in this class, 37 individuals were
WTP some positive amount to protect biodiversity. The mean bid was £19.03 and the
standard deviation £31.11. Four persons tendered a zero bid. The motives given were: "can't
afford it" (one person), "protect by law" (three people) and "biodiversity protection
unimportant" (one person). However, the person saying that biodiversity protection was
unimportant in this case also bid £100, so the response may be disregarded since the subject
clearly failed to understand the question. This same respondent was the only individual
stating that ecosystems had no rights to be protected ie., 40 respondents stated that
ecosystems have a right to be protected. Amongst these there were 18 respondents who
believed that this right should exist regardless of cost. Of these 18 “absolute rights”
respondents, 16 stated a positive bid. The correlation between WTP and a belief in absolute
rights was +0.365. All 41 respondents believed environmental problems to be serious, with
only 3 believing in technological fixes.
For the general public sample, an identical survey was carried out. The results are
summarised in Table 6. In sub-sample one (animal rights) only one person stated a genuine
zero WTP. All 64 respondents said that animals had the right to be protected, and 49 said that
this should be done irrespective of the costs. These persons included 35 who were WTP some
positive amount, and 14 who refused to state a WTP figure. The correlation coefficient
between a belief in absolute rights and WTP was -0.104.
In sub-sample two (biotic rights) of 67 respondents in this class, 42 were WTP some
positive amount. No zero bids were given for reasons of zero value. All 67 respondents said
that plants/trees had the right to be protected, of which 49 said that protection should be given
irrespective of the costs. Those believing in absolute rights but tendering a positive WTP
numbered 33, those refusing to state a positive WTP numbered 16. The correlation coefficient
between a belief in absolute rights and WTP was 0.181.
In sub-sample three (ecosystem rights) there were no zero bids given for reasons of
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zero value. All but one respondent thought ecosystems had the right to be protected, with 50
of these persons believing that this protection should be extended regardless of the cost. Of
these 50 “absolute rights” respondents, 34 were WTP some positive amount for biodiversity
protection, whilst 16 refused to state a WTP figure. The correlation between WTP and
absolute rights was +0.022.
So long as responses on income, education, and membership of conservation
organisations were unaffected by which rights question respondents received, then responses
from the three sub-samples of the general public survey can be aggregated. The following
results apply to the resultant data set, which contains 198 responses. This gives the
information, shown in Table 7, on familiarity with the general biodiversity definition, WTP,
income, sex, membership of conservation groups and educational level.
A simple linear bid curve was estimated to indicate the determinants of WTP. The
coefficients of this function are shown in Table 8. As may be seen, inc, educ and  conserv are
all correctly signed; famBD is incorrectly signed but has an extremely  high standard error.
Educational achievement, on this evidence, is the strongest influence on willingness to pay to
protect biodiversity. Alternative functional forms might give a better fit in terms of the R2
measure, whilst we might also wish to include attitudinal variables from the rights questions;
however, these vary across sub-samples, so have in this instance been omitted from the
aggregated data set. Also, there were very few respondents in the no-rights classification.
The mean WTP was thus £8.01 (including protests), which is lower than the mean
WTP amongst the student sample (£15.42), even though mean income was much lower in the
latter group. This might reflect more environmental concern on the part of students, or that
the sample of students was biased in this respect. The mean educational level was obviously
lower in the street sample than in the student sample.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A lack of knowledge about the meaning of biodiversity seems prevalent. The results
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from the student survey section lead to the conclusion that biodiversity is a poorly understood
concept among the majority of the sample. This lack of knowledge occurs despite the sample
being highly skewed in educational terms. Our conclusion from the survey of the general
public on definitions of biodiversity is that, compared with the student surveys, biodiversity is
understood even less. This raises concern over consulting the general public for their
valuations of biodiversity. Information assimilation within a survey context is restricted and
will only be able to initiate respondents as to what is being discussed. Under such
circumstances, where the general public is basically uninformed about a public good, the
information given will be helping to form preferences rather than inform existing preferences.
On the prevalence of lexicographic type preferences for biodiversity preservation, two
main measures of the extent of a refusal to trade-off income against biodiversity protection
are available: (i) respondents who stated that animals/ecosystems/plants should be protected
irrespective of the costs and who refused to give a WTP amount; and (ii) as with (i), but
where individuals have a positive WTP. Considering the general public sample we find these
categories contain 46 respondents (23.2%) and 148 respondents (74.7%) respectively. Note,
the general public sample is important from the perspective of the wider application of the
contingent valuation method. Category (i) respondents are identified as having lexicographic
preferences.
Category (ii) respondents represent an interesting case, since they are indicating that
they believe that decreases in biodiversity should be avoided, yet are WTP relatively small
amounts, in terms of their disposable income, to offset a threatened reduction. Such
individuals might be considered to have an inconsistent position although this may be a result
in some cases of a failure to think through the internal consistency of their answers to the
questionnaire. Possibly other questionnaire designs could reduce such inconsistency. An
alternative position is to say that such individuals would vote for a scheme which prevents
any deterioration in biodiversity but, in the absence of such a scheme, are WTP some amount
to prevent a deterioration. Yet, according to the theory presented in section 2, their WTP in
this case should be their entire wealth. Alternatively, we might hypothesise that these
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individuals have a minimum living standard requirement and are close to this income which
would make their behaviour consistent with the modified lexicographic position of Figures 2
and 3. On balance, we would wish to avoid classifying category (ii) respondents as having
lexicographic preferences without supporting tests of these hypotheses, and thus treat their
responses as unreliable. Therefore, we would judge around one quarter of individuals (ie.,
those in category (i) to have lexicographic preferences, indicative of a refusal to accept trade-
offs, on this evidence.
An anonymous referee has questioned the extent to which category (i) individuals are
lexicographic rather than merely desirous of a change in government expenditure between
projects, and therefore reject giving willingness-to-pay answers. However, 67% of these
individuals believe that "biodiversity should be protected by law, and we shouldn't have to
pay money to protect it", which is inconsistent with paying for it via a reallocation of
resources (you still pay at the end of the day). In addition, individuals who felt the
government should switch funds from other projects could easily have stated so under "other
reasons (please state)", but nobody did so.  Thus, there is little reason to support this
criticism.
The prevalence of lexicographic preferences clearly has implications for the
acceptability of the contingent valuation method in valuing biodiversity protection, which is
reinforced by the strong evidence of a high degree of ignorance concerning individuals
understanding of the very concept of biodiversity. As suggested earlier, interesting further
research would be to repeat the survey giving respondents WTAC questions as well as the
WTP question used here, to see whether WTAC scenarios yield responses more in line with
revealed ethical beliefs. The relationship of hypothetical bids for biodiversity protection with
actual bids in an experimental situation would also be worthy of study.
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Table 1  Definitions of biodiversity: student responses
Agreement with Definitions (% of sample)
Species Diversity Genetic Diversity Ecosystem Diversity
Agree 49.6 46.4 44.0
Disagree 31.2 36.8 33.6
Don't Know 19.2 16.8 22.4
N 125 125 125










Ecosystem Diversity 0.182 0.083
Familiarity BD 1 0.309 0.108 0.329
Familiarity BD 2 0.267 0.075 0.338 0.725
Familiarity BD 1 = familiarity with biodiversity (general definition)
Familiarity BD 2 = familiarity with biodiversity (forestry definition)
Table 3  Definitions of biodiversity: public responses
Agreement with Definitions (% of sample)
Species Diversity Genetic Diversity Ecosystem Diversity
Agree 40.0 39.0 40.5
Disagree 16.0 12.5  9.0
Don't Know 44.0 48.5 50.5
N 200 200 200










Ecosystem Diversity 0.463 0.463
Familiarity BD 1 0.298 0.230 0.398
Familiarity BD 2 0.195 0.200 0.358 0.736
Familiarity BD 1 = familiarity with biodiversity (general definition)
Familiarity BD 2 = familiarity with biodiversity (forestry definition)
25
Table 5  Summary Results for Student Stage Two Responses
Animal rights Biotic rights Ecosystem rights
WTP > 0 29 29 37
Mean WTP £15.07 £12.17 £19.03
Standard deviation of WTP £34.78 £22.41 £31.11
WTP = 0 11 11 4
Reasons for zero bid:
    Can't afford
    Protect by law
    BD unimportant
    BD unimportant here























Fundamental change in behaviour
required (number agreeing)
41 38 38
 N 42 42 41
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Table 6  Summary Results for Public Stage Two Responses
Animal rights Biotic rights Ecosystem rights
WTP > 0 43 42 48
Mean WTP £9.08 £7.54 £6.88
Standard deviation of WTP £19.43 £12.00 £13.43
WTP = 0 21 25 19
Reason for zero bid:
    Can't afford
    Protect by law
    BD unimportant
    BD unimportant here























Fundamental change in behaviour
required (number agreeing)
57 62 67
 N 64 67 67
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Table 7  WTP Analysis: Street Survey
Mean Standard Deviation
WTP (£) 8.01 15.40
Familiarity BD1 (1 to 5) 1.54 1.00
Income (£) 14696.00 10273.00
Sex  (0=male 1=female) 0.51 0.50
Conservation Groups (number) 0.19 0.44
Education (1 to 4) 1.23 1.25*
Note: Highest educational achievement: 1= O'grade; 2= higher/A'levels; 3= undergraduate;*
4= post-graduate.
Familiarity with the general BD definition (famBD1), willingness-to-pay (WTP), income
(inc), sex (sex), membership of conservation groups (conserv) and educational level (educ).
Table 8  Bid Curve Coefficients: Street Sample
coef stdev t value prob value
constant -0.306 2.98 -0.01 0.918
fam BD1 -0.683 1.17 -0.58 0.561
inc 0.0002 0.0001 1.82 0.070*
sex 4.352 2.263 1.92 0.056*
conserv 3.721 2.592 1.44 0.153
educ 2.747 1.008 2.72 0.007**






The University of Stirling is conducting a research project concerning peoples" attitudes to
the environment. This partly involves asking members of the public for their knowledge
about, and views on, environmental issues. We would be very grateful for a few minutes of
your time to answer a short questionnaire. All replies are completely anonymous.
1.  In just a few words, what does the word "biodiversity" suggest to you?
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
2.  Please answer "agree," "disagree," or "don't know":  "Biodiversity" is a measure of the
number of different species of animals and plants in a particular area (such as the Scottish
Highlands): for example, the number of different types of birds (golden eagles, sparrows,
blackbirds...), the number of different types of trees (oak, ash, elm...).
Agree Disagree Don't know
3.  Please answer "agree," "disagree," or "don"t know":  "Biodiversity" is a measure of the
extent of genetic variation within a particular species; for example, different sorts of apple
trees, different types of wheat, different breeds of sheep...
Agree Disagree Don't know
4.  Please answer "agree," "disagree," or "don't know":  "Biodiversity" measures the number
of different ecosystems in a particular area (such as Britain). For example, these different
ecosystems include marshes, pine forests, coastal beaches and  grass meadows. The more
different sorts of ecosystem there are in Britain, the greater is the level of biodiversity in
Britain.
Agree Disagree Don't know
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5.  The next question gives a definition and asks how familiar it is to you:  Biodiversity is
officially defined as the totality of genes, species, and ecosystems in a region.  Genetic
diversity refers to the variation of genes within species.  Species diversity refers to the variety
of species within a region.  Ecosystem diversity refers to the variety of systems of living
things in relationship with their environment, within a region.
How familiar were you with "biodiversity" as defined here before taking part in this survey? 
Answer by naming a digit from 1 to 5, where 1 means "totally unfamiliar," and 5, "totally
familiar."
1 2 3 4 5
(totally unfamiliar)  (quite familiar)  (totally familiar)
6.  Now we wish to discover your familiarity with biodiversity in the context of British
forests:  Biodiversity as it applies to British forests means habitats for many kinds of
organisms, not only of species of vegetation but also of animals, fungi, and bacteria; the kind
and number of such habitats depend on the total number of species of trees, on which species
are dominant, and on the complex spatial and temporal patterns that occur in forests.
How familiar were you with "biodiversity" as defined here before taking part in this survey?
Answer by naming a digit from 1 to 5, where 1 means "totally unfamiliar," and 5, "totally
familiar."
1 2 3 4 5
(totally unfamiliar)  (quite familiar)  (totally familiar)
7a.  Now we will consider how you might value British Forests as a significant source of
biodiversity, using an example.  Crannoch Wood, a Highland pine forest, is not easily
accessible to the public, but is very important in terms of biodiversity.  Many birds and
animals found here are rare, including the pine marten, the crested tit, and the capercaillie. 
Imagine that this wood was threatened by clear felling, and could only be saved by public
subscription to a charitable trust fund.  The sole purpose of this charitable trust would be to
buy and look after the wood.  What is the most that you as an individual would be willing to
pay as a once only payment to save Crannoch Wood?
The most I would be willing to pay is
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7b.  If you have said that you would not be willing to pay anything, is this because (please
tick just one sentence):
i.  You can't afford any extra expenditure?
ii. You think biodiversity should be protected by law, and we shouldn't have to pay money to
protect it?
iii.  You don't believe that biodiversity protection is important at all?
iv.  You don't believe that biodiversity protection is important in this particular example 
v.  Other reason (please state)
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
We now want to ask you some other questions about your attitudes to biodiversity.
8.  Do you believe that wild animals have the right to be protected?
yes no
In many cases, protecting wild animals is costly: for example, in terms of foregone
development benefits (such as timber, in the case of the wood), or in fencing and monitoring
costs.
If your answer (at 8) was "yes":
8a.  Do wild animals have the right to be protected irrespective of what this costs society?
yes no
If your answer (at 8) was "no":
8b. If protection of wild animals was to be made much cheaper, then would you wish them to
be protected?
yes no
9a.  Do you believe that environmental problems are of serious concern today?
yes no
9b.  Which of the following two statements do you agree with most?
i.  Environmental problems will be solved by technological progress
ii.  Environmental problems can only be solved by a fundamental change in people's attitudes
and behaviour.
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Finally, it would be of great help to us if you could give us some information about yourself,
bearing in mind that you will remain anonymous.
10.  Is the gross (before tax, etc.) annual income of your household (please tick/circle one)
under £5,000 £5-10,000 £10-15,000 £15-20,000
£20-25,000 £25-30,000 over £30,000
11.  Are you (please tick/circle one)
male female
12.  Do you belong to (please tick/circle all that you belong to)
Greenpeace
Friends of the Earth
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
Any other conservation organisations (please say which)
_____________________________________________________
13.  Do you have (please tick/circle all that you have)
O grade/CSE/Standard Grade
Higher grade/A level
Undergraduate Degree
Postgraduate Degree
A professional qualification

